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Governance reforms go off the boil. 
Pete Murphy and Russ Glennon respond to the new national framework. 
December 2017 finally saw proposals for operationalising key parts of the 2017 Crime and Policing Act 
that affect Fire and Rescue Services.  
The act made a new national framework inevitable. The previous framework from 2012, lamentably 
unfit for purpose from day one, has effectively become obsolete. The Home Office have finally issued 
a consultation on a new Fire and Rescue Framework, and the rebranded HMICFRS issued more 
detailed proposals for the inspection framework and programme for 2018/19.  
And yet, these two documents fail to impress.  The surprising number of inconsistencies between 
them adds to the impression that their release owes more to a communication strategy or timetable 
for ‘bad news’ than a desire to create a new, more efficient and effective policy and delivery regime. 
By the time you read this article, we hope to have published our detailed response to both 
consultations through the Fire Sector Federation. Our response to the framework is informed by our 
response to the HMICFRS consultation, although in view of the inconsistencies, differences in content, 
level of detail and even dissonant tone of the two documents, we intend to provide parallel responses 
to the two documents for members of the FSF to consider.   
A reinterpretation of the current context 
The new draft framework, like its predecessor, is a model of brevity.  So far, so good.  Unfortunately, 
the minister’s foreword and the subsequent introduction raise immediate concerns.  The consultation 
feels ‘stage managed’ through a series of omissions, implicit assumptions, and questionable 
interpretations. These primarily concern funding, inspection, core responsibilities and the workforce. 
The first paragraph of the minister’s foreword refers to the long-term significant decrease in the 
number of fires, and later suggests this may be partially due to successful fire protection and 
prevention.  
Yet it fails to acknowledge that while the numbers of fires are reducing, the losses from fires are up 
over fourfold per incident, reflecting increasing complexity in modern construction and occupation. It 
ignores widespread evidence that, while funding for public services is being universally reduced, this 
has been disproportionately felt in preventative services, most notably the NHS, but increasingly 
evident across all services; cutting higher profile frontline services generates greater negative 
publicity. 
There is, of course, no mention of the blistering reports from the National Audit Office1 or the Public 
Accounts Committee2 that savaged the DCLG for its poor sponsorship, leadership, financial control 
and infrastructural support for the fire service.  
There is no explicit mention of the long-term reductions and, more importantly, the future planned 
reductions in financial support from the government.  
The new Minister refers to evidence from Grenfell and Dame Judith’s interim report saying we need a 
new intelligent system of regulation and enforcement that encourages everyone to do the right thing 
and holds those that cut corners to account. And yet this makes us ask: has the government actually 
read the evidence?  
It is not only rogue builders at fault; successive governments have been steadily reducing investment 
in fire safety to the public and cutting corners with the regulatory regimes.  
Instead of a clear commitment to comprehensive improvement, we have the bald and somewhat 
implausible statement that the proposals are unlikely to lead to additional costs for businesses, 
charities, the voluntary sector or the public sector. 
To which the collective response from the sector has to be: of course…and pigs might fly!   
 ‘Core functions’, Governance, Accountability and Inspections.  
The new framework is commendably clear that the overarching statutory responsibility of every fire 
and rescue authority is to “assess all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that affect their 
communities, whether they are local, cross-border, multi-authority and/or national in nature from 
fires to terrorist attacks” and that “fire and rescue authorities must put in place arrangements to 
prevent and mitigate these risks, either through adjusting existing provision, effective collaboration 
and partnership working or building new capacity”. 
HMICFRS is equally clear that its inspections will not cover anything like that range of responsibilities. 
According to their document, HMICFRS will provide service inspections of directly-provided fire and 
rescue services. They are not going to routinely or regularly provide inspections of the governing 
bodies – whether they be fire and rescue authorities, or police and fire commissioners.  
These bodies are ultimately responsible for assessing the risks, determining strategic priorities, 
establishing the budget, and ultimately holding statutory responsibility for the safety of the public – 
but they are not going to be routinely inspected, and hence not publicly reported. 
During an inspection of services, if HMICFRS finds evidence that ‘inhibits’ the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the chief fire officer, they ‘may’ carry out a separate corporate governance inspection.  
There is no mention of cross-border, multi-authority or national inspections from HMICFRS – just that 
they intend to commence inspections in summer 2018 of the 45 fire and rescue services on the 
principal functions of a fire and rescue authority: i.e. fire safety; firefighting; road traffic accidents and 
other emergencies. We found no clarity or assurance on the inspection of services that have been 
outsourced to private or third sector providers or jointly provided with other FRS, blue-light services, 
or any other organisations.  
HMICFRS accepts that the Home Office can commission thematic or cross cutting inspections but 
clearly states that “HMICFRS is not funded to carry out thematic Inspections”.  
There is no mention of making additional resources available for thematic inspections in the Home 
Office document, and the clear impression from HMICFRS is that to carry them out in the absence of 
such funding would compromise their fiduciary duty.  
Thus, one thing that the Home Office and the HMICFRS appear to have in common is an extreme 
reluctance to inspect the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of governance arrangements.  
This ignores all historical evidence from tackling failing services and authorities, peer reviews and 
improvement regimes, performance assessments, government interventions and sector-led 
improvements.  
Any effective regulation needs to assess and address the adequacy of the leadership and of 
governance arrangements.  Beyond this, they must also consider the performance of the operational 
delivery and advice from professional officers, collaborative partnership arrangements and the 
relationship between these three components. To inspect them partially or separately surely cannot 
optimise the efficiency or effectiveness of the Inspectorate, nor provide sufficient assurance to either 
the government or the public.   
Governance remains a key potential weakness: there is no mention of examining the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the scrutiny functions of the Police, Fire and Crime Panels in either the framework or 
the HMICFRS consultation. But then neither is there any obligation to have fire and rescue expertise 
on the Police Fire and Crime Panel in the first place.  
Then again, if “the FRA should give due regard to the professional advice of the CFO when making 
decisions affecting the operation of the FRS”, why is this not applicable to the Police Fire and Crime 
Commissioner?   
 
Value for Money, evaluation and some new responsibilities. 
There is of course no acknowledgement from either the Home Office or HMICFRS of the impact of 
long term reductions in central government financial support, or explicit mention of the planned 
reductions of central government grant, or the continuing cap on generating local revenue through 
taxation. There is however, the clear assertion that fire and rescue authorities must manage their 
budgets ensuring efficient and effective use of resources while pursuing all feasible opportunities to 
keep costs down. 
There are, however, three particular generic issues that, inter alia, worry us about the government’s 
approach to assessing and achieving value for money. 
Neither the Home Office document nor the new inspectorate appear to recognise that value for 
money can vary significantly, depending on whether you measure it in the short, medium, or long 
term or that different timescales may be appropriate to different services, activities, or projects.  
Similarly, there are different tools and techniques for measuring value for money according to the 
objectives, inputs, outputs and outcomes of these services. Both documents appear predominantly to 
focus FRS attention onto short-term impacts or implications and the framework in particular appears 
to be predominantly concerned with short-term costs. 
When asked by public service providers to assess value for money (VFM), most professionals would 
want to identify the most appropriate timescale and the most appropriate techniques to use in the 
prevailing circumstances to facilitate optimal decision-making. For example, in terms of evaluation, 
you might suggest one of the following basic evaluation tools: 
 Cost-benefit analysis 
 Financial return on investment assessment 
 Multi-agency return on investments assessment 
 Social return on investments assessments. 
And yet there is little mention in either document of these when articulating their proposals for 
assessing VFM.  Similarly, the definition of value for money is often inconsistent within and between 
the two documents.  
The most common definitions of VFM used in the public sector over the last 30-plus years are the 
three Es: economy, efficiency and effectiveness. These are closely related but clearly distinct forms.  
Not only are these three concepts used inconsistently throughout the framework, there is also no 
acknowledgement these definitions also struggle to fully acknowledge and enshrine a true reflection 
of public and collective costs and benefits of service delivery; this is particularly important in 
prevention and risk-based services such as fire and rescue, rather than more traditional, demand-led 
services. 
This is particularly apposite when we consider the section on local and national resilience. Despite 
earlier assertions to the contrary, chapter seven of the framework does impose new responsibilities 
on local fire and rescue authorities and fire services.  
Developing ‘marauding terrorist firearms attack’ (MTFA) capability is one such example and while the 
document states the government has ‘committed’ significant resources, it does not say whether these 
are additional resources; in fact, the government’s commitment will come from the existing resource 
envelope.  
More specifically, paragraph 7.14 states that where they have MTFA capability, FRA must also put in 
place arrangements to “ensure their teams are fully available at all times” including periods when 
“business continuity arrangements are in place” – such as, for example, strikes? Yet another example 
that the document insinuates but doesn’t specifically mention. 
Workforce 
This naturally leads us to workforce issues.  Here prominence is again given, in both the executive 
summary and in chapter six, to the ‘re-engagement of senior officers, post-retirement’. The draft 
national framework includes the wording issued after the earlier specific consultation and advises 
there will be no changes following this current consultation process. Any re-engagement of former 
senior officers will only be in exceptional circumstances and will be subject to a public vote, although 
there is no mention of any views being sought from either FRA or PFCC scrutiny bodies.  
In fact, chapter six is mainly a series of reiterations. Each FRA (no mention of PFCC), should have a 
people strategy designed in ‘collaboration’ (not consultation) with the workforce, and taking account 
of the NFCC’s people strategy.  Each FRA must comply with the fitness principles set out in an annex.  
All FRAs must implement the standards approved by the professional standards body although a note 
advises that this part of the policy is under development, with an announcement to be made before 
the final framework is published. Here again, little practical scope for consultation exists. 
Timescales 
Chapter eight of the document concerns timescales and scope; this adds even further weight to the 
impression that the document has been rushed out. It advises that the framework will have an open-
ended duration, as was the case with the 2012 Framework. All earlier frameworks ran for time-limited 
periods which resulted in timely reviews and improvements. All key stakeholders, parliament and the 
public could call the government to account. As a recent book3 clearly argues, those earlier (pre-2012) 
frameworks were thus much more successful in significantly improving the service and the safety of 
the public. 
A welcome ‘biennial report to parliament’ will be made on the extent to which FRAs (again no mention 
of PFCC, mayors or London) are acting in accordance with the framework. However, this makes no 
mention of whether the framework itself is ‘fit for purpose’ or whether the government itself has been 
discharging its responsibilities adequately. 
For those of us who contributed to the NAO report mentioned earlier this article1, this has clear 
resonances and sets off alarm signals.  
That investigation started off with a clear focus on the adequacy of the 45 Fire and Rescue Services’ 
performance, before concluding that it was the inadequate sponsorship, leadership, financial control 
and infrastructural support for the service from DCLG that was the real issue.  
In short, Fire and Rescue Authorities and Services were not provided with the tools and techniques, 
let alone the leadership and support that would allow them to do the job…oh, well, plus, ça change! 
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